Directory

Jack Lyons

Jack Lyons

Professor

J. William Fulbright College of Arts & Sciences

(PHIL)-Philosophy

Phone: 479-575-5825

Download vcard

Map

Visit Website

Jack Lyons works mainly in epistemology, cognitive science, and philosophy of mind. He is concerned with various issues in the foundations of cognitive science, including modularity and the nature of mental representation. In epistemology, he has been trying to defend a scientifically constrained reliabilist theory, one that makes sense of both inferential and noninferential justification, and that satisfactorily responds to the traditional objections to reliabilism. Much of his recent work has concerned topics in the epistemology of perception, e.g., the role of conscious experience in perceptual justification, the influence and epistemic significance of background beliefs, the content of perceptual beliefs, and the relation between perceptual beliefs and epistemologically basic (i.e, noninferentially justified) beliefs. He is currently working on a project concerning the distinction, interface, and overlap between perception and cognition. He has a recent book on Oxford University Press, entitled Perception and Basic Beliefs, and a co-authored textbook (with Barry Ward), entitled The New Critical Thinking: An Empirically Informed Introduction (Routledge). He is editor for the journal Philosophical Topics.

Epistemology, cognitive science, and philosophy of mind.

PhD, Arizona

Selected recent publications (for full list, see CV or website): 
 
Perception and Basic Beliefs: Zombies, Modules, and the Problem of the External World. (2009). Oxford University Press. (at Amazon)
“Unconscious Evidence”. (2016). Philosophical Issues 26, 243-62. 
“Inferentialism and Cognitive Penetration of Perception”. (2016). Episteme 13, 1-28.
“Experiential Evidence?”. (2016). Philosophical Studies 173(4), 1053-1079.
“Unencapsulated Modules and Perceptual Judgment”. (2015). In J. Zeimbekis and A. Raftopoulos, eds., The Cognitive Penetrability of Perception. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
“Should Reliabilists Be Worried About Demon Worlds?” (2013). Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86, 1—40.
“Circularity, Reliability, and the Cognitive Penetrability of Perception”. (2011). Philosophical Issues 21, 289–311.