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Jack C. Lyons

Jack C. Lyons

Professor

J. William Fulbright College of Arts & Sciences

(PHIL)-Philosophy

Phone: 479-575-5825

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Jack Lyons works mainly in epistemology, cognitive science, and philosophy of mind. He is concerned with various issues in the foundations of cognitive science, including modularity, concept empiricism, the nature of representation, multiple realizability, and the recent neoreductionist movement. In epistemology, he has been trying to defend a scientifically informed reliabilist theory that makes sense of both inferential and noninferential justification. Much of his recent work has concerned topics in the epistemology of perception, e.g., the role of conscious experience in perceptual justification, the influence and epistemic significance of background beliefs, the content of perceptual beliefs, and the relation between perceptual beliefs and epistemologically basic beliefs. He has a recent book on Oxford University Press, entitled Perception and Basic Beliefs, and is an associate editor for the journal Episteme: A Journal of Individual and Social Epistemology.

Epistemology, cognitive science, and philosophy of mind.

PhD, Arizona

Book

Perception and Basic Beliefs: Zombies, Modules, and the Problem of the External World. (2009). Oxford University Press. (abstract) (precis) (at Amazon)

Papers

"Should Reliabilists Be Worried About Demon Worlds?” (2013). Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86, 1-40.

Circularity, Reliability, and the Cognitive Penetrability of Perception”. (2011). Philosophical Issues 21, 289-311.

Experience, Evidence, and Externalism”. (2008). Australasian Journal of Philosophy.

Clades, Capgras, and Perceptual Kinds”. (2007). Philosophical Topics 33, 185-206.  

In Defense of Epiphenomenalism”. (2006). Philosophical Psychology 19, 767-94.

Perceptual Belief and Nonexperiential Looks”. (2005). Philosophical Perspectives 19, 237-56.

Representational Analyticity”. (2005). Mind and Language 20, 392-422.

Carving the Mind at its (Not Necessarily Modular) Joints”. (2001). British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52, 277-302. 

Reprinted in Philosophy of Psychology: Vol. II: The Organization of Mind. (2012). Routledge.

General Rules and the Justification of Probable Belief in Hume’s Treatise”. (2001). Hume Studies 27, 247-277.

Testimony, Induction, and Folk Psychology”. (1997). Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75, 163-178.